THE SIGNALS were coming fast and furious by the first week of March. Ukrainian forces in the Kursk bridgehead, an area of Russia that Ukraine seized last August, were becoming trapped. Aided by North Korean forces, Russia had tightened a noose around the Ukrainians’ flanks and was within firing range of their last remaining supply route. The Russians had also massed at least 50,000 troops, four times the Ukrainians’ numbers. It remains unclear how they pulled it off, and what role Donald Trump’s decision (subsequently reversed) to limit intelligence sharing with Ukraine on March 5th had played. Some Ukrainian intelligence officers insist they were blindsided. “The Americans are lying if they say we had everything we needed for defence,” one says.

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