What Changed Between Israel & Hamas To Prompt A Return To War? | Analysis

More than two weeks after the completion of the first phase of the prisoner exchange deal, in Israel it became clearer that with the continuation of endless talks, Hamas is effectively gaining a continuation of the ceasefire during Ramadan. Additionally, Hamas earned a renewed time period to organize its forces and plan additional attacks – all this without releasing even one hostage.

In parallel, the efforts to apply civic pressure on the organization – including the suspension of humanitarian aid and the cessation of electricity supply to Gaza in the past two weeks – unsurprisingly proved to be inadequate faced with Hamas’s obstinacy and existing firepower.

Contrary to certain assessments in Israel, even though the Trump administration pushed for a ceasefire and for the latest deal to free the hostages, Washington also understood that there was no escape from applying military pressure to change the balance of power in the negotiations, given Hamas’s refusal.

The particularly long rope that US Special Middle East Envoy Steve Witkoff granted to Hamas last week, with a bridging proposal to release only five live captives, also did not help convince the terrorists that they would be granted long weeks of breathing space along with guarantees of its survival and ability to reorganize, rearm, and launch further threats and attacks on Israel less than a mile from the Israeli communities trying to return to life.

Last night, following an emergency discussion with the heads of the security apparatus, a decision was made to return to war. The consensus is not free from criticism: relying on military pressure might threaten the lives of the captives without ensuring flexibility on Hamas’s part. However, the reality on the ground speaks for itself. In recent weeks, despite severe civilian sanctions, American threats, and flexibility on Israel’s side, Hamas remains adamant in its demands. These include a complete end to the war, a full Israeli withdrawal from all Gazan territory (including the Philadelphia route and the perimeter protecting the western Negev), and assurance that it will be able to continue to survival as an armed force capable of planning future attacks against Israel.

So what’s different this time? Many rightfully ask how the overthrow of Hamas will be achieved after it did not happen in the last round, which lasted for a year and three months.

The answer lies in changing the conditions of the game. The end of former president Joe Biden’s term in office freed Israel from previous constraints. Israel can now re-ignite the flames without committing to humanitarian aid, and the limitations on engagement that were previously imposed have been finally lifted. The IDF, which now faces only the southern front, without needing to simultaneously deal with the Hezbollah threat, is in a better position of power. Hamas is also weaker than before, as two months of ceasefire were not enough for it to fully recover. Its ability to smuggle has been severely damaged, and its senior commanders, Mohammed Deif and Yahya Sinwar, are no longer alive. Above all, the uncompromising American support allows Israel to operate freely against the organization.

But alongside the strategic advantages, the concern weighs heavy for the fate of the remaining 24 hostages believed to still be alive. The testimonies of the survivors revealed horrifying captivity conditions and the immediate danger they were in – whether from neglect or from the fear that Hamas would hurt them as retribution for the resurgence of fighting. At the state level, it is recognized that their release will only be achieved in a deal, but a deal that will preserve Hamas’s ability to threaten the Israeli communities nearby is not feasible in the current balance of power.

The decision to return to war is not based solely on hope for the release of abductees, but also on solid intelligence: Hamas has already planned (and perhaps still plans) additional raids on Israel, taking advantage of the ceasefire for renewed organization. In this sense, returning to battle is not just a tactical move, but an immediate security necessity to prevent the next blow.

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *